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Abstract 
We compare the capability of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism and the Vickrey 
auction to reveal willingness-to-pay information for a sample of French consumers. We 
measure the bias and dispersion of bids relative to valuations. We find that the Vickrey 
auction, for the particular training procedure we employ, is more effective as a 
willingness-to-pay elicitation device than the BDM process. We conjecture that 
differences in the shape of the payoff function account for some of the differences. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Demand revealing auctions are potentially powerful vehicles for eliciting willingness-to-
pay information. The dominant strategy of truthful bidding and the commitment of real 
money create an incentive to truthfully reveal limit prices, regardless of the risk attitude 
of the bidder and the strategies other participants use. A demand-revealing auction has 
the advantage over the study of purchase decisions with field data that it allows an 
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  1individual’s limit price to be measured directly. Observing only whether or not an 
individual purchases a product merely establishes whether or not his limit price exceeds 
the current market price. Accurate willingness-to-pay information is particularly useful 
for new products because other sources of demand estimates on which to base profit or 
cost-benefit calculations are not readily available.
1 Experimental economists have 
employed demand revealing auctions to study limit prices for goods as varied as 
consumer products (see for example Hoffman et al., 1993; Bohm et al., 1997; List and 
Shogren, 1998; and List and Lucking Reilly, 2001), food safety (Hayes et al., 1995; Fox 
et al., 1998; Busby et al., 1998; Huffman et al., 2000; and Lusk et al., 2001), and lotteries 
(Grether and Plott, 1979; Cox and Grether, 1996).  
The two most widely used demand-revealing mechanisms in experimental 
economics are the second price sealed bid auction, also called the Vickrey auction 
(Vickrey, 1961), and the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker et al., 
1964).  In a second price sealed bid auction, each subject simultaneously submits a bid to 
purchase a good. The agent who submits the highest bid wins the auction and receives the 
item, but pays an amount equal to the second highest bid among the bidders in the 
auction. In a BDM each subject simultaneously submits an offer price to purchase a good. 
Afterwards, a sale price is randomly drawn from a distribution of prices with support on 
an interval from zero to a price greater than the anticipated maximum possible 
willingness-to-pay among bidders. Any bidder who submits a bid greater than the sale 
price receives a unit of the good and pays an amount equal to the sale price.  
                                                 
1 See for example Hoffman et al. (1993), who use demand revealing auctions to elicit willingness to pay 
information for new packaging for meat products or Noussair et al (2002b), who study consumer valuation 
for genetically modified foods.  
  2There is a substantial literature studying the behavior of the two mechanisms in 
the laboratory when university student subjects are bidding for goods. Some of this 
research has used the technique of induced values (Smith, 1982) to create limit prices for 
fictitious goods. The experimenter offers a guarantee that bidders can resell goods at 
prices that are specified in advance, should they purchase the items in the auction. 
Several authors, including Coppinger et al. (1980), Cox et al. (1982), Kagel et al. (1987) 
and Kagel and Levin (1993), have studied the behavior of the Vickrey auction, and Irwin 
et al. (1998) and Kellar et al. (1993) have studied the BDM process using goods with 
induced values. These studies reach a variety of conclusions about bids relative to 
valuations, and some suggest that average bids are biased away from valuations. For 
example Kagel et al. (1987) and Kagel and Levin (1993) find that most winning bids in 
the Vickrey auction are higher than valuations. Irwin et al. (1993) find that the BDM 
process is more successful at eliciting true valuations for certain distributions of sale 
prices than others. Furthermore, all of the studies show that there is heterogeneity in 
bidding behavior that leads to a dispersion of bids relative to valuations. In the case of 
auctions for goods with homegrown (and therefore unobservable) valuations, such as 
consumer products, the evidence that bids tend to differ from valuations is indirect. Bohm 
et al. (1997) find that bids in the BDM are sensitive to the choice of endpoints of the 
distribution of possible transaction prices. List and Shogren (1999) find that bids in the 
Vickrey auction tend to increase as the auction is repeated. This suggests a bias in 
bidding either in the early or the late periods. Rutstrom (1998) finds that the two 
mechanisms generate different mean bids for the same objects, indicating that at least one 
of the two must be biased.  
  3In this paper we explore the demand revelation capabilities of the two 
mechanisms with a diverse sample of consumers. In theory, of course, the mechanisms 
lead to the same result irrespective of the population that is participating. However, the 
behavior of our subjects is of interest because they constitute a more appropriate sample 
than university students for evaluating preferences over many products that are not 
targeted to student populations. Our subjects have an age and gender profile close to that 
of the general population and consist exclusively of people who make purchase decisions 
for their household.  
Although both the BDM mechanism and the second price sealed bid auction are 
incentive compatible in the sense that under each technique there is a dominant strategy 
to truthfully reveal preferences, the two processes differ in substantive ways that might 
affect behavior.
2 The most obvious is that the Vickrey auction is a game in which a 
participant interacts with other players, whereas the BDM places subjects in a situation of 
individual choice. However, as we describe in section four, the cost of suboptimal 
behavior also varies considerably between the two mechanisms, unless the distribution of 
sale prices for the BDM is appropriately adjusted, and unless all subjects in the Vickrey 
auction are following the dominant strategy. Though strategic uncertainty about other 
players’ actions in the Vickery auction does not affect the optimal strategy, it does affect 
the expected cost of deviating from it. In addition to the above considerations, there is 
                                                 
2 The BDM mechanism is formally equivalent to a second price sealed bid auction played against one other 
bidder, who bids her valuation, and whose value is drawn from the same distribution of valuations as that 
of the BDM prices. 
  4also a difference between the framing of the two auctions that might lead to differences in 
their behavioral properties.
3  
In our analysis of the data, the questions we focus on are the following: (1) Does 
either or both of the systems contain a bias toward under or over-revelation of the 
willingness-to-pay? (2) Under which system are individuals more likely to bid near their 
true value? (3) Under which system is convergence by repetition toward demand 
revelation, if it occurs, more rapid? We pose these questions under specific conditions, 
when the population considered is a diverse sample of the population, when the goods 
considered have induced valuations, and when specific training procedures are in effect 
that our experience and intuition suggest would enhance the performance of the 
mechanisms. We argue that the Vickrey auction, accompanied by an appropriate training 
procedure, functions quite reliably in eliciting valuation information. As we report in the 
pages that follow, the Vickrey auction generates initial average bids closer to valuations 
and then more rapid convergence of bids toward valuations than the BDM. Both auctions 
have a bias toward underbidding in early periods as agents seem to “test” the market 
(Plott, 1996) with low bids, but this effect is more severe in the BDM than in the Vickrey 
auction. Under our training procedures, 90% of subjects in the Vickrey auction bid within 
                                                 
3 Multi-unit generalizations of the Vickrey auction have also been studied. When there are k units to be 
sold, and each demander wishes to purchase at most one unit, a sealed bid auction in which the k highest 
bidders each receive a unit and pay a price equal to the k+1
st highest bid induces a dominant strategy of 
bidding an amount equal to one’s valuation. When agents wish to purchase multiple units there is no single 
price demand revealing mechanism. A demand revealing mechanism exists in which the k highest bidders 
receive units and each bidder, for his jth accepted unit, pays an amount equal to jth highest rejected bid 
submitted by a bidder other than himself (Vickrey, 1961). Hoffman et al. (1993) employ a random kth price 
auction for the single unit demand case. The number of units sold, k, is drawn randomly after the bids have 
been submitted. The k highest bidders each receive a unit and pay a price equal to the kth highest bid. The 
use of a random k is intended to give bidders who are unlikely to be marginal for a fixed k, either because 
they have valuations much higher or lower than the marginal valuation, a stronger incentive to truthfully 
bid their valuation. Shogren et al. (2001) compare bidder behavior in the random kth price auction and the 
second price sealed bid auction. They find that the second price sealed bid auction generates bids closer to 
valuations for players whose valuations are close to the margin between winning and failing to win a unit. 
However, bids are closer to valuations under the random kth price auctions for off-margin bidders. 
  510% of their valuations and 77% bid within 2%, after forty-five minutes of training. We 
turn to these procedures in section 2. 
 
2. PROCEDURES 
The participants in our experiment were residents of the Grenoble, France area. 
199 subjects took part in the experiment, each taking part in one of the 26 sessions. The 
ages of the 199 subjects that participated in our study ranged from 18 to 79 years, and 
averaged 34 with a standard deviation of 14 years. 43.8% were male. The subjects were 
varied in their educational attainment and their occupations. 26% of our subjects were 
college graduates, and 38% had at least some education beyond high school. 74% had 
completed their Baccalaureate, the equivalent of a high school diploma.  
In 16 of the sessions, subjects participated in Vickrey auctions and the remaining 
ten sessions, the BDM process was used. The sessions were conducted between June 
1999 and July 2000, at the Ecole Nationale Supérieure de Génie Industriel (ENSGI) at 
the Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble (INPG) in Grenoble, France. In each 
session there were between 3 and 14 participants. Details of the experimental procedures 
are available from the authors. 
Candidates were chosen by drawing names randomly from the Grenoble, France 
telephone directory for recruitment by telephone. At the time of recruiting, subjects were 
asked if they were consumers of orange juice or cookies and if they made purchase 
decisions for their household. If they responded affirmatively to both questions, they 
were invited to come to the laboratory to sample food products for a publicly funded 
research project conducted by university professors. They were given no other details 
  6about what would take place during the session. 11% of telephone calls yielded a 
participant. No subject participated in more than one session. Subjects did sample food 
products in each experiment as advertised, but after they were trained in the use of the 
bidding mechanisms, that is, after they participated in the auctions reported here. Subjects 
were told that they were learning a special buying procedure that would be used for the 
entire experiment. This created an additional incentive to find an optimal strategy, since it 
was likely to yield future gains.
4 
The procedures of the sessions were designed to facilitate learning of the 
dominant strategy, rather than to provide an unbiased test of theoretical propositions, 
which is the case with most experimental research. The instructions are available from 
the authors. They reflect special considerations that come into play when studying 
participants with varied educational backgrounds. Experiments conducted with university 
students, who share a common age and educational background, permit the use of a 
particular vocabulary. This was a resource not available to us in this study.  
Upon arrival at the laboratory, each subject received 150 francs (roughly US$21) 
in cash. They were then told that they would be bidding for consumer products later in 
the session, but beforehand there would be a phase in which they could learn about and 
practice the bidding process that would be used later on. Subjects then bid for several 
periods, in either a Vickrey auction or a BDM depending on the session, for an item 
called X, which had an induced value. In each period, each subject drew a valuation for X 
independently from a common uniform distribution. The distribution changed from 
period to period, and differed between sessions. The highest possible valuation range was 
                                                 
4 The focus of this paper is on comparing the behavior of the two auctions in the training phase in which 
goods with induced values were auctioned. For the results of the study of food products, see Noussair et al. 
(2002a, 2002b). 
  7221-389 FF (US$ 29-52), and the lowest was 13-56 FF (US$ 2-7). Ranges were typically 
wider for the Vickrey auction, to compensate for the greater expected earnings due to the 
higher probability and greater conditional gains from receiving a unit in the BDM 
process. The payoff functions of the two mechanisms are discussed in section 4 of this 
paper in more detail.
5 At the time of bidding under both mechanisms, subjects were not 
aware of the valuations of other bidders nor the distribution from which their own and the 
others’ valuations were drawn.  
During sixteen of the sessions we used Vickrey auctions.
6 In each auction, 
subjects simultaneously submitted a bid to purchase a good. The agent who submitted the 
highest bid won the auction, but paid an amount equal to the second highest bid among 
the bidders in the auction. The other bidders did not receive items and paid zero. No 
communication between subjects was allowed during the bidding process.  
In the remaining ten sessions, the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism 
(Becker et al, 1964) was studied. The rules of the BDM mechanism were the following. 
Each subject simultaneously submitted an offer price to the experimenter in a closed 
envelope. The experimenter then randomly drew a sale price from a range of prices 
spanning the endpoints of the distribution, from which bidders’ willingness to pay was 
drawn. This was done by drawing a piece of paper from a box containing the possible 
prices. The fact that the box was chosen before bids were submitted made it common 
knowledge that the sale prices were determined independently of the bids. The range was 
                                                 
5 It is, in principle, possible that the use of a different scale of valuations for the two mechanisms could 
influence the comparison between them. However, we felt that it was preferable to compare the 
mechanisms under conditions in which the expected payoff from the process was similar rather under 
conditions where the valuations are similar and the expected payoff to bidders differed greatly.  
6 There were between 5 and 9 participants in the sessions in which the Vickrey auction was used. This 
meant that a bidder always had between 4 and 8 competing bidders. 
  8pre-specified but unknown to the subjects, though subjects knew that the sale prices 
would be drawn from the range of possible valuations. Any subject who submitted a bid 
greater than the sale price received an item and paid an amount equal to the sale price.  
Under both processes, after the subjects submitted their bids, the experimenter 
wrote all of the valuations and bids on the blackboard, without identifying to whom they 
belonged. He then asked the following four questions to the group of subjects, who were 
free to volunteer responses and to engage in open discussion on the topics. The 
experimenter did not participate in the discussion beyond posing the initial question. A) 
Which bid was yours?   B) Which bidder(s) won items?  C) How much did the winner(s) 
pay? D) Do you regret the bids you submitted, now that you know how much the others 
bid? 
The purpose of the first three questions was to verify that subjects were paying 
attention to their behavior, that they understood the rules of the mechanism, and that they 
understood how to earn money. The fourth question was intended to stimulate discussion 
about how subjects’ decisions might be improved. 
After the discussion, the experimenter announced publicly which subjects 
purchased units. Those subjects then received an amount of money equal to their induced 
valuation minus the price, as determined in the auction. The cash was physically placed 
on the desk in front of the subject after the auction, to emphasize that there were real 
monetary earnings at stake. A series of identical auctions was conducted using the same 
procedure, but with new randomly chosen induced values each time. The bidding 
continued until the time available was exhausted or until at least 80% of bids in a period 
were within 5% of valuations.  
  9 
3. RESULTS 
We use two measures to compare the mechanisms. The first measure is the overall 
average bias of the mechanisms in period t, normalized by the valuation. It indicates the 
extent to which average bids are higher or lower than valuations. The bias for period t is 
calculated as Σj[bjt – vjt]/vjtnt, where bjt denotes player j’s bid in period t,  vjt  is her 
valuation in period t, and nt is the total number of bidders in period t. The second measure 
is the average dispersion, defined for period t as Σj|[bjt – vjt]|/vjtnt. The dispersion is equal 
to the average absolute value of the difference between bids and valuations, normalized 
by the valuation. For an individual bid, the dispersion is the absolute value of the bias. 
Table 1 illustrates the average value of each measure over the course of the sessions 
under both processes. The standard deviations are indicated in parentheses. 
Figures 1a-j indicate the number and percentage of bids under each process and in 
each period that were less than, equal to, and greater than the valuation of the participant 
submitting the bid and the distribution of the size of the deviations of bids from 
valuations.  
 
[Table 1 and figures 1a-j: About Here] 
 
The figures reveal the following patterns.
7 Both auctions are highly biased in 
period 1, with bids tending to be below valuations. This bias is larger and the dispersion 
is greater under the BDM mechanism.  Overall, 90% of subjects bid less than their 
                                                 
7 Figures 1g and 1h, and the column entitled “Period 4” in table 2 also contain data from period 3 for the 
sessions that only lasted three periods. Figures 1i and 1j and the column entitled “Last Period” in table 2 
contain only the data from the last period of all sessions.  
  10valuations and only a very small percentage bid more than their valuations. 2.44% of 
participants bid more than their valuations in the BDM process and 5.98% did so in the 
Vickrey auction. The percentage bidding an amount equal to their valuations is also small 
in both auctions, between 6 and 7 percent of subjects under both systems, though 17% 
bid within 2% of their valuations in the Vickrey auction. 
On average, under the BDM mechanism, bids are 39.87% lower than valuations 
with standard deviation (of the percentage difference between bid and valuation) of 
28.89%. In the Vickrey auction, the period 1 average bid is 30.16% less than the 
corresponding valuation with a standard deviation is 32.53%. Pooled variance t-tests 
indicate that the bias is significant at the p < .01 level for both mechanisms. The 
proportion bidding less than their values is greater in the BDM than in the Vickrey 
auction. The magnitude of the average underbid is less severe in the Vickrey auction. The 
average underbid was 44.56% of the valuation for BDM and 35.98% for the Vickrey 
auction. The average absolute difference between bids and valuations, our measure of 
dispersion, is 41.65% in the BDM compared to 32.57% in the Vickrey auction. Both the 
average bias and the average dispersion are significantly greater than in the BDM than 
the Vickrey auction at the p < .05 level. Thus, in the practice period, the Vickrey auction 
is less biased, exhibits less dispersion, and has a greater percentage of agents bidding 
within 2% of values.   
  In period 2, the first auction that counted toward subjects’ earnings, both auctions 
remain biased, but less so than in period 1. The introduction of monetary payments as 
well as repetition appears to improve decisions. 87.8% of bids in the BDM and 76.07% of 
those in the Vickrey auction are less than valuations. The bias is –28.06% of valuation for 
  11the BDM and –11.50% for the Vickrey auction. The decline in the bias is steeper in the 
Vickrey auction than in the BDM. The bias in the BDM decreases by 29.6%, whereas in 
the BDM the decline is of 63.3%. The decline is mainly due to a reduction in the amount 
that agents underbid, and not to a decrease in the percentage of agents underbidding. The 
percentage bidding equal to valuations increases to over 10% overall and is slightly 
higher in the Vickrey auction than in the BDM. The overall dispersion shrinks in both 
systems but the decrease is steeper in the Vickrey auction (51.5% versus 31.4%). Thus, 
the overall data from periods 1 and 2 suggest that the Vickrey auction is less biased, 
exhibits lower dispersion, induces a greater percentage to reveal their exact valuations, 
and improves its performance more quickly over time. 
  These trends continue in subsequent periods. The overall bias decreases in each 
subsequent period for both processes, reaching zero in the Vickrey auction and 6% in the 
BDM mechanism. In each of the five periods, the bias in the BDM is significantly greater 
in magnitude than in the Vickrey auction at p < .05 (according to a pooled variance t 
test). Beginning in period 4, the bias is no longer different from zero at conventional 
significance levels in the Vickrey auction. However in all 5 periods, the bias is significant 
at the 5% level in the BDM. The percentage of agents bidding an amount equal to their 
valuations increases from period to period under both processes, reaching 41.46% for the 
BDM and 68.38% for the Vickrey auction in the last period. If lattitude of 2% of the 
valuation is allowed in considering a bid to equal the corresponding valuations, the data 
in figure 1i show with the Vickrey auction, 77% of bids are within 2% of valuations and 
90% are within ten percent of valuations. The dispersion between bids and valuations 
decreases in each period of the BDM. Though the same measure increases between 
  12periods three and four in the Vickrey auction, the overall trend is clearly downward. The 
average absolute difference in the last period is 3.89% in the last period of Vickrey 
compared to 11.75% in the BDM. In the Vickrey auction, the dispersion is significantly 
less than in the BDM at p < .01 in all periods except for period 4. Therefore, in the time 
horizon, for which it was feasible to study the behavior of our subject pool, the Vickrey 
auction generated data much closer to truthful bidding than did the BDM. 
Tables 2a-d illustrate the dynamics from period to period. Though subjects were 
not paid for their period one activity, they calculated their profits as if they were being 
paid and could use the hypothetical profit information to change their behavior in period 
2. Tables 2a and 2b illustrate dynamics in the BDM. Between periods 1 and 2, the 
tendency for underbidding remains strong. 67 of the 75 who underbid in period one 
continued to do so in period 2. Of the seven subjects who did not underbid their 
valuations by at least two percent in period 1, four underbid by more than two percent in 
period 2. Table 2b shows that all nine subjects who bid within 2 percent of their values in 
period 2, continued to do so in period 3. 15 of 71 of the period 2 underbidders bid within 
2% of their valuations in period 3. Overall 15% change their category in period 2 and 
26% do so in period 3. A similar dynamic continues into the later periods, as is suggested 
from figures 1 and 2.  
  Tables 2c and 2d illustrate the corresponding data for the Vickrey auction. It 
shows a clear dynamic of subjects moving from bidding less than their values toward 
bidding equal to their values. 23.6% of those who underbid in period 1 bid an amount 
close to their valuations in period 2. Overall the percentage bidding within 2% of their 
values increases from 17% to 30% in period 2. 44% of those bidding less than their 
  13valuations in period 2 proceed to bid near valuations in period 3, whereas 92% of those 
who were within 2% of valuations in period 2 remained so in period 3. 32% of bidders in 
period 2 and 36% in period 3 changed category, higher percentages than under the BDM. 
Once our subjects have begun to bid truthfully in the Vickrey auction, as in the BDM, 
they continue to do so. However, the convergence dynamic toward truthful revelation of 
values is faster in the Vickrey auction. 
 
      [Tables 2a-d: About Here] 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
The expected loss of deviating from truthful revelation for a typical bidder in the 
experiment is shown in figure 2, which indicates the payoff function for a bidder in the 
50
th percentile of valuations under a uniform distribution on the interval [0,1000]. The 
figure shows the expected payoff, divided by the maximum possible expected payoff, for 
all possible bids from an agent in a Vickrey auction facing five other demand revealing 
bidders, whose valuations are drawn from a uniform distribution. The figure also includes 
the expected payoff as a percentage of the payoff at the optimum of a player facing a 
uniform distribution of sale prices under the BDM. The payoff functions of bidders with 
different valuations involve fixed shifts along the range of valuations and thus have the 
same properties as those described below.  
  The figure suggests two relationships of note. The first is a marked difference 
between the consequences of deviating from the dominant strategy under the two 
mechanisms. In the Vickrey auction, bidding either under or over one’s valuation by a 
  14given amount is always costlier than under the BDM in terms of foregone expected 
earnings as a percentage of expected earnings at the optimum. The second relationship is 
that in the Vickrey auction, if there are three or more bidders, a deviation of a given 
magnitude from the dominant strategy is costlier when it involves bidding higher than 
when it involves bidding lower than the optimum. This asymmetry does not exist for the 
BDM mechanism. The BDM is equivalent to bidding against one demand-revealing 
opponent, while the Vickrey auction can involve bidding against multiple players. 
Underbidding reduces the probability of winning in the Vickrey auction more rapidly 
than in the BDM as the bid decreases. Bidding more than one’s value raises the 
probability of winning more rapidly than the BDM as the bid increases. However, the 
likelihood that this overbidding translates into losses, because the second highest bidder 
bids an amount above one’s value but also below one’s bid, also increases rapidly. 
  The two relationships are general if the distribution of valuations is uniform. To 
see this, consider the BDM mechanism. The expected price conditional on bidder j, who 
has valuation vj, purchasing a unit, if the distribution of sale prices is uniform on the 
interval [0, vmax], equals bj/2, where bj is the bid that j submits. The expected payoff 
conditional on winning the auction then equals vj - bj/2. Since the overall probability that 
bidder j wins the auction with a bid bj is given by bj/vmax, the expected payoff from 
submitting bid bj is Πbdm(vj,bj) = [vj - bj/2]* [bj/vmax]. It can be readily verified that the 





v j .       ( 1 )    
On the other hand, in a Vickrey auction with n > 2 bidders, the expected purchase 
price for bidder j given that she purchases a unit and is facing n-1 demand revealing 
  15competitors is equal to (n-1)bj/n and the probability that bid bj is a winning bid equals 
[bj/vmax]
n-1. Thus the expected payoff for bidder j in competition with n-1 other bidders 
equals Πvn(vj,bj) = [bj/vmax]
n-1*[vj - (n-1)bj/n]. It also has a maximum at bj = vj but with an 
expected payoff at the optimum of  
 
Πvn(vj,vj) = [vj/vmax]
n-1*[vj - (n-1)vj/n].        (2) 
 
To show that any possible individual deviation from optimal behavior is more 
costly in percentage terms in the Vickrey auction than in the BDM mechanism, it is 
sufficient to show that for any bj ≠ vj, Πbdm(vj,bj)/Πbdm(vj,vj) > Πvn(vj,bj)/Πvn(vj,vj). It is 
clear from the above derivation of the objective functions that the payoff function for the 
BDM mechanism is identical to that of a Vickrey auction with two bidders. We now 
show that in any Vickrey auction, the expected percentage loss from deviation to any bj ≠ 
vj is increasing in n, which implies that the loss is greater in the Vickrey auction with 
three or more bidders than in the BDM. We show that, for any bj ≠ vj, 
 
Πvn(vj,bj)/Πvn(vj,vj) > Πvn+1(vj,bj)/Πvn+1(vj,vj).     (3) 
 
Substitution of the expressions obtained earlier for Πvn(vj,bj),  Πvn(vj,vj), 
Πvn+1(vj,bj), and Πvn+1(vj,vj), and cancellation of terms reduces the inequality to vj
2 + bj
2 > 
2vjbj/n. The inequality is always satisfied since n > 2, and vjbj < max{vj
2, bj
2} for all bj ≠ 
vj. It is always more costly to deviate by a given amount from the optimal strategy under 
the Vickrey auction than under the BDM mechanism. 
  16While in the BDM the expected payoff function is symmetric about the optimum, 
under the Vickrey auction, the function is not symmetric. Bidding greater than vj by any 
amount ε < max{vj, vmax - vj}  yields a lower expected payoff than bidding vj - ε. In other 
words Πvn(vj,vj - ε) > Πvn(vj,vj + ε). To see this property, consider the function Φ(vj, ε, n) 
= Πvn(vj,vj - ε) - Πvn(vj,vj + ε). Φ(vj, ε, n) equals  
 
[(vj – ε)/vmax]
n-1*[vj - (n-1)(vj-ε)/n] - [(vj + ε)/vmax]
n-1*[vj - (n-1)(vj+ε)/n].    (4) 
 
The function Φ is continuous and equals zero when ε = 0. Therefore, to show that 
the expected payoff from bidding vj - ε is greater than from bidding vj + ε for all ε > 0, it 
is sufficient to show that the first derivative is greater than zero for all positive ε. Taking 

















































    (5) 
Since ε > 0, n > 2, vmax > 0, the overall expression is positive. The difference in 
payoff between bidding ε lower than one’s valuation and ε greater is increasing in ε, and 
therefore always positive. The difference is larger the greater the value of ε. 
Given that there is an initial bias under both mechanisms, the Vickrey auction 
contains more powerful feedback leading agents to adjust their bids in the direction of the 
optimum than the BDM does. It is more costly to deviate from bidding one’s valuation, 
and there is more to be gained from improvement of a given suboptimal strategy, in the 
Vickrey than in the BDM. We believe that the shape of the payoff function is a major 
factor accounting for the lower observed absolute deviation of bids from values in the 
  17Vickrey auction after the first period, and the greater speed of convergence of the 
Vickrey auction toward the dominant strategy. The bias is smaller in the Vickrey auction 
because a bias is more costly: an agent’s earnings fall more quickly as his bid decreases 
in the Vickrey than in the BDM. However, the existence of more effective feedback 
under the Vickrey auction does not explain the initial downward bias in both auctions.   
    
    [Figure 2: About Here] 
 
Our results invite comparisons to earlier work. Irwin et al. (1998), who concluded 
that the BDM was effective in revealing willingness-to-pay, also observed that the shape 
of the payoff function had no effect when the BDM decision task was transparent to 
subjects, but promoted learning when the optimal strategy was not transparent. We 
believe that for the subject pool used in our study, and for many other non-student subject 
pools, the optimal strategy is not transparent for either the BDM or the Vickrey auction. 
The conclusion of Irwin et al., that the shape of the payoff function plays a major role in 
the changes in subject behavior over time when the optimum is not deduced from logic, is 
consistent with what we have observed in this study. 
We are also in agreement with earlier studies that have found that the Vickrey 
auction is biased, and that subjects do not easily discover the dominant strategy. 
However, we believe that the direction of the bias may be sensitive to certain aspects of 
the experimental design: the distribution of valuations, the information given to subjects 
about the distribution, the maximum and minimum possible bids, the subject pool 
  18employed, the wording of instructions, and other factors.
8 Our procedures in this study 
differ drastically from previous studies (e.g. Kagel and Levin, 1993) where bidding 
greater than valuations was widely observed. However, unlike those studies, we have not 
attempted to design our experiment to provide an unbiased test of a theoretical model. 
Our protocol choices were guided by our desire find a simple willingness-to-pay 
revelation system with low bias and dispersion. We believe that we have successfully 
developed a training procedure that leads to a small bias and reduces dispersion after 
relatively few periods, and we believe it to be effective regardless of the direction of the 
initial bias.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Our research indicates that, given the procedures we have used in our study, the 
Vickrey auction is preferable to the BDM mechanism as an instrument for the elicitation 
of the willingness-to-pay for private goods. We observe that the BDM is subject to more 
severe biases, greater dispersion of bids, and slower convergence to truthful revelation 
than the Vickrey auction. With our techniques, neither auction could be made into a 
perfect tool to reveal valuations with our subjects, at least not during the time horizons 
                                                 
8 One possible explanation for bids above valuations is that placing subjects in a role of buyers suggests 
that one of the objectives of the experiment was to make purchases even when it might be not in their 
economic self-interest to do so. Submitting bids higher than valuations increases the probability of making 
a purchase even though it lowers the expected payoff of the bidder. 
One of our referees has suggested an interesting possible explanation for the low incidence of 
bidding greater than valuations in our Vickrey auction data relative to other studies using student subjects. 
Bidding above valuations in previous studies of the Vickrey auction may be due to concern about relative 
payoffs on the part of bidders. Players may bid more than their values to prevent others from winning the 
auction and earning a positive profit. However, because the level of anonymity between the subjects in our 
study, who are recruited from a diverse city of 150,000 people rather than from courses at a university, is 
much greater than in the typical experiment conducted with student subjects, relative payoffs are less of a 
concern. The small number of bids greater than valuations that we observed here may be due to such a 
phenomenon.  
. 
  19that were available to us. However, the Vickrey auction performs better than the BDM by 
the three criteria we have set for it.  Our experimental protocol was effective in debiasing 
the Vickrey auction over several periods, but less effective on the BDM. Of course, it 
remains unknown whether unbiased bidding for goods with induced values carries over to 
subsequent bidding for goods with homegrown values.
9 
Our research affirms that the Vickrey auction can be an effective tool for demand 
revelation with non-student subject pools, but also cautions that sufficient practice and 
appropriate training in the rules of the auction is important. Based on observations we 
have made during the course of our research, we propose some training techniques to use 
with the Vickrey auction to enhance its demand revelation capability. Revealing publicly 
subjects’ bids, corresponding valuations, and earnings seems to help participants emulate 
successful strategies. Open discussion between subjects, where they themselves volunteer 
analyses of the properties of the mechanism, appears to facilitate learning. The use of our 
particular discussion questions focuses subjects on those aspects of the auction, which are 
essential for the comprehension of their incentives. The sale of goods with induced values 
that differ by subject for training purposes creates a clear distinction between learning the 
rules of the process and updating preferences. This difference can become blurred if 
subjects are trained through the sale of products with homegrown values, and 
convergence to common values may occur. It also appears to us that explaining and 
suggesting the optimal strategy to subjects directly is less effective than a technique that 
allows them to learn on their own. Subjects do not learn the process by reading the rules, 
                                                 
9 There are also theoretical possibilities for why the demand revelation property may not hold when values 
are homegrown. For example, if a bidder is not risk neutral and believes that there is error in her estimate of 
her true value of the item for sale at the time of bidding, neither the Vickrey auction nor the BDM are 
incentive compatible. 
  20but rather by active participation. Giving subjects their cash immediately after every 
transaction is valuable in establishing the credibility of both gains and losses in the 
experiment. The fact that we do not use computers seems to make the decision situation 
less abstract. 
We close with a conjecture on how learning to use the dominant strategy in the 
Vickrey auction might be accelerated by the use of Japanese auctions (such as the English 
clock auction studied by McCabe et al., 1990; and Kagel and Levin, 2001). In a Japanese 
auction, the experimenter increases the price of the product in small increments, and 
subjects indicate whether or not they wish to purchase a unit at that price. Exit is 
irrevocable in the sense that once an individual indicates a quantity demanded of zero, he 
may not re-enter the auction. When quantity demanded equals quantity supplied, the 
auction stops and the remaining demanders each receive a unit and pay the current price. 
Under our proposed system, training would proceed in three periods. In the first period, 
subjects would participate in a Japanese auction and afterward engage in a discussion 
along the lines of our protocol. In this first period, the auction would be “open” in that 
agents would observe the dropout prices of other bidders. In the second period, they 
would participate in another Japanese auction, in which they do not observe the dropout 
prices of other bidders until after the end of the auction. They would then engage in a 
discussion as in our experiment. In the third period, they would be asked to simply state 
their dropout prices without playing out the auction. The experimenter would determine 
the winner on the basis of the dropout prices. This third auction is formally equivalent to 
and as rapid to implement as a Vickrey auction. 
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  25Table 1 – Deviations of Bids from Valuation (All bids)  
 
  Period 1  Period 2  Period 3  Period 4  Last Period
BDM       
Average bias 























Vickrey       
Average bias 























Significance Tests (t-stats 
from pooled variance t-tests) 
     
Ho: BBDM = BV  2.17 4.48 2.84 2.71 2.78 
Ho: BBDM = 0  -12.50 -11.38  -4.94  -3.14  -2.74 
Ho: BV  = 0  -10.03  -4.48  -5.05  .57  -.06 
Ho: DBDM = DV  2.20 3.47 4.63 1.39 3.82 
Ho: DBDM = 0  14.37 11.97  7.42  6.10  5.77 
Ho: DV  = 0  11.70  7.30  5.83  4.01  4.04 
 
  26Table 2a: Bid Strategies in Period 2 as a Function of Bid in Period 1: BDM Mechanism 
 
                           Period 2 
Period 1 
B < .98v  .98v ≤ b < 1.02v  b ≥ 1.02v  Total period 1 
bids 
b < .98v  67  6  2  75 
.98v ≤ b < 1.02v  2 3 0  5 
b ≥ 1.02v  2 0 0  2 
Total period 2 bids  71 9  2  82 
 
 
Table 2b: Bid Strategies in Period 3 as a Function of Bid in Period 2: BDM Mechanism 
 
                           Period 3 
Period  2 
b < .98v  .98v ≤ b < 1.02v  b ≥ 1.02v  Total period 2 
bids 
b < .98v  50  15  6  71 
.98v ≤ b < 1.02v  0 9 0  9 
b ≥ 1.02v  0 0 2  2 
Total period 3 bids  50 24  8 82 
 
 
Table 2c: Bid Strategies in Period 2 as a Function of Bid in Period 1: Vickrey Mechanism 
  
                           Period 2 
Period 1 
b < .98v  .98v ≤ b < 1.02v  b ≥ 1.02v  Total period 1 
bids 
b < .98v  64  22  7  93 
.98v ≤ b < 1.02v  6 14 0  20 
b ≥ 1.02v  2 0 2  4 
Total period 2 bids  72 36  9  117 
 
 
Table 2d: Bid Strategies in Period 3 as a Function of Bid in Period 2: Vickrey Mechanism 
  
                           Period 3 
Period 2 
b < .98v  .98v ≤ b < 1.02v  b ≥ 1.02v  Total period 2 
bids 
b < .98v  39  32  1  72 
.98v ≤ b < 1.02v  2 33 1  36 
b ≥ 1.02v  3 3 3  9 
Total period 3 bids  44 68  5  117 
 




Figure 1a:Vickrey Period 1 (without payment)           Figure 1b: BDM Period 1 (without payment) 
 
Figure 1c:Vickrey Period 2 (with payment)    Figure 1d: BDM Period 2 (with payment) 
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Figure 1g:Vickrey Period 4      Figure 1h: BDM Period 4  
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     Figure 1i: Vickrey Last Period      Figure 1j: BDM Last Period 
 
  30Figure 2: Payoff Function in BDM and Vickrey as Percentage of 
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